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OUT WITH THE NEW, IN WITH THE OLD: REIMPLEMENTING TRADITIONAL FORMS OF JUSTICE
IN INDIAN COUNTRY
By Nicholas R. Sanchez
I speak for our ancestors.
They cry out to you from the unstill grave.
I speak for the children yet unborn.
They cry out to you from the unspoken silence.
I am the Indian voice.
Listen to me!
I am a chorus of millions.
Hear us!
Our Eagle cry will not be stilled!
***
We are the voice of the earth,
Of the future,
Of the Mystery.
-Leonard Peltier282
Think of a system with an end goal of restorative justice,
which uses equality and the full participation of disputants
in a final decisi . If e a f a ha : ife c e f
i,
then where there is hurt, there must be healing.

-Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation Robert Yazzie 283

LEONARD PELTIER, PRISON WRITINGS, 48 49 (Harvey Arden, 1999).
Robert Yazzie, Life Comes from It: Navajo Justice, DAILY GOOD NEWS THAT
INSPIRES (Jun. 30, 2016), http://www.dailygood.org/story/1327/life-comes-fromit-navajo-justice-chief-justice-robert-yazzie// [https://perma.cc/W6WG-XLKS].
282
283
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Euro-American law has viewed the tribal justice system with
disdain and mistrust. 284 Often times, outright racist and slanderous
language has been used to describe traditional tribal justice systems.
Fo in ance, adi ional fo m of j ice ha e been called ed
man e enge. 285
However, traditional forms of Indian 286 justice tend to be
more similar to civil alternative dispute resolutions or mediation
han o he U.S. p ni i e c iminal j ice
em. 287 These justice
systems are important to Indian victims to allow healing to the
individual, the community, and even the offender.
Because of the differences and mistrust between tribal
justice and Euro-American justice systems, the U.S. Legislature and
he fede al co
ha e con in all limi ed
ibal co
jurisdiction.288 Legislation and Supreme Court cases have placed
limits on jurisdiction that have hindered the ability for Indians to use
traditional forms of justice to help heal victims, offenders, and
Indian communities.289 Perhaps the biggest obstacle to traditional
justice is the fact that, because of legislative actions and case law,
tribal courts have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.290
Until 1978, Indian people in the U.S. held the ability to
prosecute non-Indians for crimes committed on tribal lands. In 1978,
the Supreme Court limited tribal courts c iminal j i dic ion o onl
Indian people in a decision called Oliphant. After Oliphant, if a nonIndian commits a crime in Indian Country, the non-Indian cannot be
prosecuted in tribal courts.291 Non-Indian defendants may only be
prosecuted in federal district court or state court federal courts
Barbara Creel, Tribal Court Convictions and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Respect for Tribal Courts and Tribal People in Federal Sentencing,
46 U.S.F. L. REV. 37, 58 (2011).
285 Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883).
286 The term Indian is used in this paper as that is the term is used in the United
States Constitution and statutory law. To keep consistent throughout this paper,
Indian will be used to mean Indigenous or Native American.
287 Robert D. Garrett, Mediation in Native America, 49 DISP. RESOL. J. 38, 39
(1994).
288 See, e.g., Major Crimes Act 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2013) (diminishing criminal
jurisdiction for serious crimes to federal courts); Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
25 U.S.C. § 1301 1341 (2010) (forcing a modified version of the Bill of Rights
onto Tribal governments); Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)
(disallowing tribes to prosecute non-Indians, for crimes committed in Indian
Country) (hereinafter Oliphant).
289 See supra Section I.
290 See supra Section I, II.
291 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 204.
284
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have jurisdiction over non-Indians and for some tribes, whose land
is governed by Public Law 280, states have jurisdiction. 292
However, given the limited resources that federal prosecutors
have,293 the high crimes rates on reservations,294 and the relatively
low federal prosecution rates for several common crimes committed
in Indian Country295 crimes committed by non-Indians on tribal
lands are rarely investigated or prosecuted. 296
In this paper, I argue that Oliphant has limited the ability for
Indian people to heal and recover from crimes that harm individuals
and the community. Section I gives a background of the history of
Indian criminal law and explains the current test for criminal
jurisdiction for tribal courts. Section II explores the Montana rule,
which governs whether there is civil jurisdiction over non-Indians
in tribal courts. Section III introduces Navajo Peacemaking, a
traditional form of justice, as a case study for other forms of
traditional justice. The purpose, procedure, and history of
peacemaking is described as well. Next, the section presents one city
that has used peacemaking as a basis for their own justice system.
This Section further discusses how traditional forms of justice can
help Indian and non-Indian people. Section IV proposes using civil
jurisdiction to employ traditional justice techniques to what would
otherwise be criminal matters. Specifically, it explores creating civil
jurisdiction for non-Indians by creating a consensual relationship
using contracts.
One possible way to re-implement traditional forms of
j ice de pi e hi ob acle, i b
ing a con en al ela ion hip
to create civil jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court has
recognized that an Indian nation has civil authority when the parties
en e con en al ela ion hip
i h he ibe o i membe .297
18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2010) (giving state jurisdiction over criminal matters in
Indian Country); Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 204.
293 Larry Cunningham, Deputization of Indian Prosecutors: Protecting Indian
Interests in Federal Court, 88 GEO. L.J. 2187, 2203 (2000).
294 Id. at 2198 (stating that Indian face a di p opo iona el highe a e of
iolen c ime han o he ace . ).
295 Id. at 2203 (federal prosecutors are busy prosecuting the many other
nationally recognized cases within their very broad subject-matter
j i dic ion In con a , Indian country offenses are often relatively
mino like d nk d i ing, eckle d i ing, pe
hef , pe a a l , andali m,
li e ing, and e en pa king iola ion . ).
296 Id.
297 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 547, 565 (1981).
292
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Although it has not been fully litigated, the Supreme Court has
explained that such relationships can be created by commercial
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. 298 To form the
consensual relationship could be as simple as putting up a sign
requiring those who enter Indian Country to consent to tribal court
jurisdiction.299 To constitute a consensual relationship a contract
between the tribe and non-Indian visitors, would have to be valid
under contract law and have a sufficient nexus to implementing
traditional justice.
The paper concludes that non-Indians should be subject to
traditional forms of justice to keep tribal people healthy, keep their
community safe, and further the goals of tribal courts. This paper
proposes that these goals can be met within the confines of current
Supreme Court case law. Specifically, tribes could use their civil
regulatory power to expand traditional forms of justice akin to civil
alternative dispute resolution.
I.

THE HISTORY AND CURRENT LIMITATIONS OF CRIMINAL
TRIBAL JURISDICTION

In the context of criminal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
and Legislative Branch have set out the parameters of their
jurisdiction thoroughly. The implementation of Euro-American
laws into Indian justice systems have substantially limited tribal
sovereignty.300 This Section discusses major Supreme Court
decisions, legislation, and the current test for criminal and civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Following the first contact between Indian people and
Europeans, Europeans started to settle America with the purpose to
trade with the Indigenous populations and to acquire lands.301 In
1787, a newly formed United States of America adopted its
constitution and formalized the relationship the country had with

Id. at 565.
A sign is only one potential way to make a contract. Tribes can find creative
ways to create a contractual relationship with those on or using their land.
300 Zoann Snyder-Joy, Self-Determination and American Indian Justice, NATIVE
AMERICANS, CRIME, AND JUSTICE 38 (Marianne O. Nielsen & Robert Sullivan
1996).
301 FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE INDIANS, INDIAN TRIBES, AND
THE CONSTITUTION 3 (2009).
298
299
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Indians.302 Diplomatic interactions between the two parties, after the
Revolutionary War, usually culminated in treaties, which were
agreements between two sovereigns. 303 Although there were over
350 treaties signed, nearly all have since been broken or
disregarded.304 Even though the U.S. Constitution recognizes tribal
sovereignty in the Indian Commerce Clause, there has been no
constitutional test or boundary set to prevent over-encroachment
into that sovereignty.305
A. The History of Criminal Law in Indian Country
Indian criminal law and jurisdiction is a jumbled puzzle of
Supreme Court cases and legislative actions that have resulted in a
steady decline of tribal sovereignty. The following is the history of
relevant cases and legislative action that create the modern test for
criminal jurisdiction.
1. Standing in Federal Courts and the Cherokee Nation
Cases
The Cherokee Nation cases are the cornerstone of which
Indian jurisdictional issues were built upon. The Cherokee Nation
cases were two of the three cases that make up what has become
known as the Marshall Trilogy, named for Supreme Court Justice
John Marshall, who penned them. 306 The two Marshall trilogy cases
that relate to tribal criminal jurisdiction are Cherokee Nation v. State
of Georgia307 and Worcester v. Georgia.308

Id.
Id.
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 These three cases are the cornerstone of the legal and political standing of
Indian na ion . John on . M In o h, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Che okee Na ion .
State of Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (hereinafter Cherokee Nation); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (hereinafter Worcester).
307 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1.
308 Worcester, 31 U.S. 515.
302
303
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a. Cherokee Nation v. the State of Georgia, the
Creation of the Domestic Dependent Nation
Cherokee Nation, was the paramount case on Indian criminal
jurisdiction. The Cherokee Nation was facing the Removal Act of
1830, pursuant to which the Cherokee were forcefully removed from
their homes resulting in the death of twenty percent of the Cherokee
population.309 The Cherokee Nation challenged the removal in two
ways. First, they wrote a plea to the United States government. 310
Congress was unmoved, and President Jackson refused to uphold
the Cherokee Nations treaty rights. 311 The Cherokee Nation then
appealed to the Supreme Court.
In he Che okee Na ion appeal o he S p eme Co
he
T ibe in oked he Co
o iginal j i dic ion, b Geo gia
q e ioned he Co
original jurisdiction.312 The Supreme Court
only has original jurisdiction, as established in Article II of the
Con i ion, he e he e i a ca e affec ing Amba ado , o he
public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be
party. The Cherokee Nation argued that the Supreme Court had
original jurisdiction o hea i ca e a ing ha i a a fo eign
na ion again a a e. 313 The Supreme Court decided that an Indian
ibe i no a fo eign a e in A icle III e m , beca e in A icle I,
Section 8, treats Indian tribes and foreign nations as discrete, and
not identical entities.314
Justice Marshall, continuing his opinion in dicta, created an
Indian law doctrine which has been both a blessing and a curse to
Indian Sovereignty. The Court pronounced the relationship in which
the Federal Government and Indian tribes interact for purposes of

Indian Removal: 1814-1858, PBS,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4p2959.html [https://perma.cc/2LW495UN] (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).
310 Pommersheim, supra note 20, at 103 (The Cherokee Nation wrote a
memo ial o Cong e
a ing: [ ]e i h o emain on he land of o fa he .
We have a perfect and original right to remain without interruption or
molestation. The treaties guarantee our resident and privileges and secures us
against intruders. Our only request is, that these treaties may be fulfilled, and
he e la e ec ed. ).
311 Id.
312 Id. at 104.
313 Id.; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 11.
314 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 11.
309
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Indian affai a one of p pilage. 315 T ibe a e dome ic
dependen na ion of he fede al go e nmen and he g a diana d analog ha become a doc ine of he
ela ion hip
between the United States and tribal nations. 316
The decision both recognized the tribal sovereignty, and
reasoned ha
ibe a e elian on he fede al go e nmen
kindne and i po e . 317 This case defined U.S.-tribal relations
as a fiduciary relationship where the trustee, the United States, acts
for the beneficiary tribe in regard to land, natural resources, and
protecting the tribe from states imposing their power over the
tribe.318
The opinion in Cherokee Nation recognized an essential
tribal sovereignty, created a unique tribal-federal relationship, and
established a basic principle in Indian law that the federal
government, not the states, has exclusive authority in Indians affairs.
b. Worcester v. Georgia, the Creation of Tribal
Sovereignty
Two years later, tribal jurisdiction was questioned again in
Worcester. However, this case was appealed using the Supreme
Co
appella e j i dic ion, and in hi ca e he Co
a ed i
appella e j i dic ion o e he ma e a clea . 319 The substantive
issue was: did Georgia have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
on Indian land? This time, the Court, able to reach the substantive
matter, answered in the negative.
The Co , ecogni ing he ibe o e eign and he
relationship between the Government and the tribe looked to the
ea . The Co no ed ha he ea : e plici l ecogni e[e ] he
national character of the Cherokees, and their right of selfgovernment; thus, guaranteeing their lands; assuming the duty of
protection, and of course pleading the faith of the United States for
that protection; has been frequently renewed, and is now in full
fo ce. 320 The Court stated that because the government, by making
a ea
i h he Indian ibe, ecogni e hem a a di inc ,
Id. at 13.
Pommersheim, supra note 20, at 105.
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
320 Id. at 519.
315
316
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independent political communit[y], retaining their original natural
igh . 321 Therefore, the State cannot impose its legal system on
tribal lands to either Indians or non-Indians.322
2. Kan-gi-shun-ca, the Creation of Criminal Jurisdiction
Kan-gi-shun-ca, or the case formerly known as Crow
Dog,323 furthered the recognition of tribal sovereignty, by
recognizing criminal jurisdiction over Indians on a reservation as
inhe en o a ibe o e eign . 324 In this case, Kan-gi-shun-ca shot
and killed Chief Spotted Tail. 325 Both the victim and assailant were
Brule Sioux and Brule law required that Kan-gi-shun-ca make
epa a ion o Spo ed Tail famil , h p o iding j ice fo he
ic im famil .326 While justice had been served under traditional
Brule law, non-Indians who lived near the reservation were not
satisfied with the outcome, and Kan-gi-shun-ca was arrested.327
Kan-gi-shun-ca was found guilty of murder and sentenced to
hang.328 Kan-gi-shun-ca appealed his sentence, as the Supreme
Court ruled that the government did not have jurisdiction over
Indian on Indian crime.329
Similar to Worcester, the U.S. Supreme Court looked to the
treaty to find jurisdiction as the tribe was recognized as a sovereign
a e h o gh he ibe
ea . The Court stated that the Brule
Sio
ea onl di c ed he fo fei e of c iminal j i dic ion
of non-Indians committing crimes within Indian Country and
offen e commi ed b Indian again
hi e pe on . 330 Because

Id.
Snyder-Joy, supra note 19 at 39.
323 Ex Parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883) (Kan-gi-shun-ca is Crow
Dog in the traditional Sioux Brule language).
324 CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE, 40 (Jerry Gardner, 2004).
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 Id.
328 Id.
329 Id.
330 Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556, 563, 571 (1883) ( eading ha , [i]f
bad men among the whites or among other people subject to the authority of the
United States shall commit any wrong upon the person or property of the
Indians, the United States will, upon proof made to the agent and forwarded to
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs at Washington City, proceed at once to
321
322
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of the language of the treaty, it was clear that the Brule Sioux
forfeited criminal jurisdiction to the state with crimes involving an
Indian and non-Indian.331 Although the tribe forfeited its ability to
prosecute non-Indians in the treaty, the treaty did not discuss Indianon-Indian crime.332 Therefore, the United States did not have
jurisdiction over Indian-on-Indian crime. The court in its reasoning
no ed ha ibe a e hei o n poli ical bod and ha a pa of
being i o n poli ical bod nece a il implie
he abili of
elf-gove nmen . 333 Incl ding he abili
o
eg la [e] b
themselves . . . their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of
order[,] and peace among their own members by the administration
of hei o n la and c om . 334
3. Cong e
Re pon e o Kan-gi-shun-ca: the Major
Crimes Act
Cong e , nhapp i h he S p eme Co
deci ion, came
out with the Major Crimes Act of 1885, 18 U.S.C. § 1153.335 The
Major Crimes Act gives criminal jurisdiction to federal courts for
seven crimes murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to
kill, arson, burglary, and larceny. 336 The Major Crimes Act had been
originally proposed by the Indian Rights Association (IRA).337 The
IRA believed that what was best for Indians was to assimilate to
Euro-American culture and to follow the rules of whites. 338
The Major Crimes Act was deliberately lobbied for the
purpose of assimilation, even though many missionaries and
teachers on reservations had noticed that as the reach of traditional
Indian law was diminished, the crimes from and against Indians
began to increase at a disturbing rate. 339 For instance, Bishop H.

cause the offender to be arrested and punished according to the laws of the
United States and also reimburse the injured person fo he lo
ained. ).
Id.
Id. at 572.
333 Id. at 568.
334 Id.
335 Garrow, supra note 43, at 40; 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2013).
336 18 U.S.C. § 1154 (2013).
337 Garrow, supra note 43, at 44.
338 Id.
339 Id.
331
332
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Hare, a missionary for the Sioux tribe, noted that as the Sioux
Indian legal
em began o di appea :
Civilization has loosened . . . Women are brutally
beaten and outraged; men are murdered in cold
blood; the Indians who are friendly to schools and
churches are intimidated and preyed upon by the
evil-disposed; children are molested on their way to
school, and schools are dispersed by bands of
vagabonds; but there is no redress . . . as long as by
the absence of law Indian society is left without a
base.340
Pursuant to the Major Crimes Act, Indian people were now subject
to Euro-American law and punishment. Because the previous
restorative justice foundations that Indian culture was built upon had
been swiftly eroded in a single act, a void was created on
reservations for law and order.
4. Indian Civil Rights Act
The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), was enacted in 1968,
for the purpose of guaranteeing Indian tribes some of the protections
that are guaranteed to states.341 While ICRA did promulgate some
of the Bill of Rights to tribes, it also severely restricted the ability
for tribes to use their court systems to have a justice system, as tribes
were only able to subject a person to a sentence no greater than one
year of imprisonment or a fine of $5,000. 342
ICRA was proposed in response to Indians complaining of
civil rights depravations on reservation land. 343 In response, the bill
was framed by Senator Sam Erwin (D-NC) as a remedy for what he
saw was an inability of the tribes to administer justice on
reservations.344 That is even though Indian nations complained
Id. at 45.
11 Fed. Proc. Forms § 41:71; 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indians; Native Americans § 29.
342 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(B) (2010).
343 Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the American Indian Before the
Subcomm. On Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 87th
Cong., pt. 3, at 769 (1962).
344 Donald L. B ne , J ., An Hi o ical Anal i of he 1968 Indian Ci il
Righ Ac , 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 557, 582 588 (1972) (listing the
340
341
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during the drafting period; expressing concerns over the trouncing
of culture and traditions the bill would cause.345 By applying most
of the Bill of Rights provisions to Indian nations, Congress directly
shaped the development and application of tribal law.346
ICRA also granted power to Indian nations by defining their
po e of elf-go e nmen . 347 These powers include: all
governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive,
legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and tribunals by and
h o gh hich he a e e ec ed. 348 This text expressly grants
Indian nations judicial power, one that the United States Supreme
Court previously had assumed was inherent in their right to selfgovern.349
ICRA was later amended to include Public Law 280. 350 This
amendment gave some specifically listed states criminal jurisdiction
in Indian Country.351 Originally, Public La 280 j i dic ion a
mandatory for both the state and the tribe, but it was later amended
so that the state can retrocede their criminal jurisdiction.352
5. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, Taking Away
Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction over non-Indians

mistreatments as physical abuses towards Indians, the failure to prosecute
crimes, refusal to fund tribal justice systems, and imposition of federal
restrictions on the operation of tribal courts); see also Hearings on
Constitutional Rights of the American Indian Before the Subcomm. On
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 87th Cong., pt. 3, at
769 (1962) (statement of Sen. Ervin).
345 Samuel E. Ennis & Caroline P. Mayhew, Federal Indian Law and Tribal
Criminal Justice in the Self-Determination Era, 38 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 421, 434
(2014).
346 Id.
347 Pub. L. No. 90 284, tit. II, § 201(2), 82 Stat. 73, 77 (1968) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012)).
348 Habeas corpus, 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012).
349 Ex Parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556, 565. (1883).
350State Jurisdiction Over Offenses Committed by or Against Indians in the
Indian Country, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321 1326 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1360
(2012)).
351 Assumption by State of Criminal Jurisdiction, 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (2011);
Those five states were California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
Later, Alaska was added. Public Law 280, TRIBAL COURT CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/pl280.htm [https://perma.cc/ENG2-MHCP].
352 Retrocession of Jurisdiction by State, 25 U.S.C. § 1323. (2011).
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In Oliphant, the Supreme Court ruled that tribal courts do
not have jurisdiction over offenders that are non-Indian.353 In
Oliphant, two non-Indians, Mark Oliphant and Daniel Belgrade,
lived on a reservation and independently violated Suquamish Law
and Order Code.354 Mark Oliphant was arrested for assaulting a
tribal police officer and resisting arrest. Daniel Belgrade was
arrested for taking tribal police on a high-speed chase through
reservation land and crashing into a tribal police car. They were
arraigned and an appeal followed, in which the federal district court
ruled that tribal courts had no jurisdiction over non-Indians.355
The Suquamish Indian Tribe argued that criminal
j i dic ion o e all pe on on a e e a ion i a sine qua non 356
of tribal sovereignty.357 The Supreme Court disagreed stating that
Cong e had belie ed he legi la ed he inabili fo Indian o
impose criminal penalties to non-Indians and that the Supreme
Court at that point expressly forbade it. 358
This decision was a major blow to tribal sovereignty and
reaffirmed the belief of many Indians that they were powerless to
stop people of other races from committing crimes against them. 359
For the tribal police, the decision was an attack on their ability to
protect their own people. 360 Scholars c i ici ed J ice Rehnq i
opinion a a no el depa e f om he ba ic ene of Indian la . . .
that Indian tribes retain inherent sovereignty over internal affairs
ab en e p e ab oga ion b Cong e . 361 In this respect, Justice
Rehnquist reversed the deference given to Congress over Indians,
holding that Indians can only have criminal authority over nonIndian
i h Cong e
app o al he e gene all , befo e hi
Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,195. (1978).
Id. at 194.
355 Id. at 191.
356 Meaning an essential condition.
357 Id. at 196.
358 Id. at 204 10.
359 Geoffrey C. Helsey, Oliphant and Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction over NonI dia : A e i g C g e
Pe a P e
Re
e Te i ia
Jurisdiction, 73 IND L.J. 1051, 1055 (1998).
360 Id.
361 Philip S. Deloria & Neil Jessup Newton, The Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal
Courts Over Non-Member Indians, 38 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 70, 71 (1991)
( Throughout most of the history of federal Indian law, the United States
Supreme Court has expresses extraordinary deference to Congress as the
p incipal polic make in Indian affai . ); Cong e
po e in hi a ea i
efe ed o a i plena po e . Id.
353
354
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decision, Indians had authority unless Congress had taken that
authority away.
While the Oliphant decision severely limited criminal
jurisdiction, later decisions have allowed tribes to use civil
regulatory powers that this paper argues could be used to implement
traditional means of Indian justice. 362
B. Current Test for Criminal Law Jurisdiction
The current test for criminal jurisdiction is oftentimes
de c ibed a a pa ch o k j i dic ion. 363 Three distinct
governments are involved in criminal jurisdiction for Indians: tribal,
state, and federal.364 There is a four-part inquiry to determine if one
of those three government entities have criminal jurisdiction (1)
where did the crime occur?; (2) does a federal statute, such as Public
Law 280, confer exclusive jurisdiction on a state?; (3) is the crime
one of general federal applicability?; (4) what is the race of the
victim and the accused?365
1. Was the Crime Physically Committed in Indian
Country
The first question in the inquiry is whether the crime
occ ed i hin he bo nd of Indian Co n . Indian Co n i
statutorily defined as all land i hin he limi of an Indian
e e a ion ; all dependen Indian comm ni ie ; and all Indian
allo men , he Indian i le o hich ha e no been e ing i hed. 366
Indian Country does cover land that is owned by nonIndians. For instance, during the Allotment Era, large amounts of
Indian land were sold off to white people heading west. 367 This
created a checkerboard effect on Indian land. 368 After the Allotment
Era ended, the checkerboard was defined as a part of Indian Country,

See infra Section I. C.
Cunningham, supra note 129, at 2189.
364 Id.
365 Id.
366 Indian country defined, 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (c) (1994).
367 Robert T. Anderson, Negotiating Jurisdiction: Retroceding State Authority
Over Indian Country Granted by Public Law 280, 87 WASH. L. REV. 915, 920
21 (2012).
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as part of the treaty land promised to Indians, but was no longer
owned by Indians.369 A dependen Indian comm ni [ ] i land ha
i dependen on he fede al go e nmen fo a i ance. 370 All that
i eq i ed i ha he comm ni be a a d of he fede al
go e nmen . 371
If the crime was not committed in Indian Country, the state
or federal government has authority over the matter. 372 If the crime
was committed on Indian Country, then the second question is
asked.
2. Federal Statute Conferring Exclusive Jurisdiction on a
State
The second question is whether a federal statute confers
exclusive jurisdiction to a state. Congress has the inherent power to
change jurisdiction between the tribal, state, and federal
judiciaries.373 The largest conference of judicial authority was done
through the passage of Public Law 280, wherein 1953, the federal
government mandated criminal jurisdiction to five states.374 In 1968
that statute was amended to add a sixth state and allowed the tribe
to consent to the jurisdiction. 375 Congress has also ceded federal
jurisdiction to New York376 and Kansas377 in other Acts.
In Public Law 280 states, New York, and Kansas, the federal
government maintains no jurisdiction. Currently, tribes may
maintain concurrent jurisdiction, but scholars believe that
conc en j i dic ion i
incompa ible
i h he c en
j i dic ional egime in P blic La 280 a e . 378 Thus generally,
if the crime was committed in a Public Law 280 state, or New York
or Kansas, the state has jurisdiction. If the crime was not committed

Id. at 921.
Cunningham, supra note 129, at 2190.
371 Id.
372 Id.
373 Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness
in California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L REV. 1405 (1997).
374 State Jurisdiction Over Offenses Committed by or Against Indians in the
Indian Country, 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1953).
375 Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 42, at 1406.
376 Act of July 2, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-881, 62 Stat. 1224.
377 Act of June 8, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-565, 54 Stat. 249.
378 Cunningham, supra note 129, at 2191.
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in one of those states, the jurisdictional question proceeds to step
three.
a. General Federal Applicability
If the crime committed is a crime of general federal
applicability, then the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction.
These are crimes such as mail theft and treason. If the crime is not
one of general federal applicability, then the prosecutor moves to
step four.
b. Race of the Victim and the Accused
The race of the victim and the offender is the most essential
question of whether the tribal courts have jurisdiction. Whether or
no omeone i an Indian i de e mined b
he he he pe on in
question has some demonstrable biological identification as an
Indian and ha been ociall o legall ecogni ed a an Indian. 379
Only if both the victim and the offender are Indian, or if the offender
is Indian and the crime is a victimless crime, does the tribe have
jurisdiction over the matter. If the victim is a non-Indian, then the
tribe has concurrent jurisdiction.
The modern test for criminal jurisdiction prevents tribal
courts from being able to prosecute non-Indian people. Therefore,
this paper proposes other workarounds are necessary to be able to
maintain some order within Indian Country. Civil jurisdiction
presents one such workaround.380
II.

THE APPLICABILITY OF CIVIL JURISDICTION
TO NON-INDIANS

A tribe generally has civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian on
Indian fee simple land. 381 However, due to the checkerboard of
Robert Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A journey Through
a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 520 (1976).
380 See infra Section I.C.; Section III.
381 Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981); see supra Section II a (stating
that later court decisions have muddied this rule and lower courts have gone in
diffe en di ec ion on ha le applie ). A fee imple land in e e i [a]n
interest in land that, being the broadest property interest allowed by law, endures
379
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interests that non-Indians have in Indian Country, it is not
uncommon for a non-Indian to escape civil jurisdiction in tribal
courts for any number of reasons.382 In addition to civil jurisdiction
on fee simple lands, the Supreme Court of the United States has
created civil jurisdiction in tribal courts over non-Indians in certain
circumstances under the Montana Rule.383 Since Indian tribes are
unable to criminally enforce laws, and Indian land has become a
patchwork of jurisdictions due to a plethora of historic
disenfranchisement of Indian people to their land, Indian tribes can
extend their civil regulatory power in Indian Country using the
Montana Rule.
A. Checkerboard Jurisdiction
Fo pe hap all of he Uni ed S a e legi la i e, poli ical,
and social history tribal land has been actively divided into many
ownerships, such that a person traveling through Indian Country will
typically travel in and out of Indian fee-land.384 The Allotment Era,
for instance, vested areas of Indian land of no more than 160 acres
to any one Indian.385 At the same time, however, the federal
government divested a lot of that land causing Indian inventory of
land to fall by sixty-two percent.386
Even when Indian land was not affected by the Allotment
Era, non-Indian used the Burke Act to obtain lands from Indians
ha o he i e o ld ha e emained in
. 387 Of the 86,000,000
total acres that were lost, 38,000,000 were sold to non-Indians as
pl
land .388 Following these sales, the exterior boundaries of
until the current holder dies without heirs. FEE SIMPLE, Black' Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 452 (1997).
Montana, 450 U.S. 544.
384 Robert Anderson, Negotiating Jurisdiction: Retroceding State Authority Over
Indian Country Granted by Public Law 280, 87 WASH L. REV. 915, 921 (2012).
385 Patents to be held in trust; descent and partition, 25 USC § 348 (1940).
386 See Pommersheim, supra note 20, at 255-56 (citing Charles F. Wilkinson,
American Indians, Time, and the Law 20 (1987)). Monroe Price and Robert
Clinton estimate a 90 -million-acre loss over the period. See Monroe E. Price &
Robert N. Clinton, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN: READINGS, NOTES AND
CASES 629 (2d ed. 1983).
387 L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribe Sovereignty at the Millennium,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 830, n. 130 (1996).
388 Id.
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many reservations were redrawn, officially diminishing tribal
territory.389
Keeping in mind the history that has plagued Indian land
igh , ho
ho e land igh ha e affec ed Indian abili
o
adjudicate, is complex. Nonetheless, the Montana rule, which
permits tribes civil jurisdiction outside of Indian trust land, gives
tribes the ability to enforce civil laws within a checkerboard
jurisdiction.
B. Civil Regulatory and Adjudicatory Authority Over NonMembers
The Supreme Court has found that Indians have the legal
authority to adjudicate non-member Indians 390 when the Indian tribe
has regulatory power over those same people, whether they are on
or off tribal land.391 If the tribe has the authority to regulate, then it
has the power to adjudicate said regulation. 392 That being said, the
po e o adj dica e doe no e ceed he ibe a ho i
o
regulate.393
C. The Montana Rule
The United States Supreme Court decided the issue of
whether Indians had civil regulatory power over non-Indian people
in Montana v. U.S.394 The Supreme Court had previously recognized
ha Indian na ion a e dome ic dependen na ion 395 that retain
all inhe en o e eign po e no i hd a n b ea o [fede al]
statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent
status.396 Therefore, Indian nations should maintain civil regulatory
power over non-Indian people; however, by the time of Montana,
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A non-member Indian, is an Indian that is a member of another tribe.
391 Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 814
(9th Cir. R. 2011).
392 Sarah Krakoff, Tribal Civil Judicial Jurisdiction over Nonmembers: A
Practical Guide for Judges, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1187, 1213 (2010).
393 Id. (citing A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. at 452).
394 Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
395 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1, 17.
396 U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
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the Supreme Court had to reconcile contradictory precedents.397 In
doing so, the Supreme Court created the Montana Rule, which states
that Indian tribes may not exercise civil regulatory authority over
non-Indians, except in two circumstances. 398 First, a tribe may
eg la e he ac i i ie of nonmembe
ho en e [in o] con en al
ela ion hip i h he ibe o i membe . 399 Second, a tribe may
regulate the conduct of non-Indian
hen ha cond c h ea en o
has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. 400
Focusing on the first exception, in a recent decision, the Fifth
Circuit has delineated clear rules on when a person or entity
con en
o ibal j i dic ion. 401 Dolgencorp Inc., better known
as Dollar General Store, had operated a business within the
boundaries of tribal land.402 As a part of the agreement to operate on
tribal land, there was a lease agreement that mandated Dollar
General Store to participate in the Yo h Oppo ni P og am
(YOP), which requires the hiring of young tribal members. 403
Subsequently, the manager molested his employee and was sued in
tribal court.404 The manager argued tribal courts have no jurisdiction
over non-Indians, the Fifth Circuit did not agree.405 The court ruled
that by doing business on the reservation he had consented to tribal
jurisdiction.406
The Fifth Circuit, affirmed by a four-four split by the U.S.
Supreme Court, stated that while a suit against a non-Indian creates
issues of subject-ma e j i dic ion, a fede al co
ha no
independen obliga ion o co ec a ibal co
lack of bjec ma e j i dic ion e cep fo in e ao dina ci c m ance . 407
Dean B. Suagee, The S e e C
Whac -a- e Ga e The
i
Federal Indian Law, a Theory that has No Place in the Realm of Environmental
Law, 7 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 90, 97 (2002).
398 450 U.S. at 565.
399 Id.
400 Id. at 566; In the 34 years since Montana, courts have steadily narrowed both
exceptions to the rule. See AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 191 210 (Claw
Smith ed., 4th ed. 2008).
401 Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167
(2014) (Affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court. Dollar General Corp. v.
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (June 23, 2016).
402 746 F.3d at 169.
403 Id.
404 Id.
405 Id. at 170.
406 Id.
407 Id. at 176 77.
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Therefore, an Indian nation is presumed to have civil jurisdiction
over non-Indians except in special circumstances. There have been
no cases, as of yet, which define those special circumstances that
may eliminate the presumption of civil jurisdiction.
1. The Montana Rule Applied
As stated, Indians are presumed to have civil jurisdiction on
Indian trust land. The Montana exceptions specifically apply to a
person that is not a member of a tribe, and not on tribal fee land, but
still within Indian Country. 408 However, later cases have muddied
the previous clear rule stating that the Montana rule applies both on
and off Indian fee land. 409 For instance, in Nevada v. Hicks, the
Supreme Court looked at whether a tribe may assert jurisdiction over
civil claims against a state official who entered tribal land to execute
a search warrant against a tribe member. 410 The court ruled that
because the tribe lacked legislative authority to restrict, condition,
or otherwise regulate the ability of state officials to investigate offreservation violations of state law, they also lacked adjudicative
a ho i o hea he e ponden claim ha ho e official ho
violated tribal law in the performance of their duties.411
In applying Hicks, lower courts have diverged into separate
camps. For instance, the Eighth and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
has expressly held that Hicks extended the Montana analysis to all
reservation lands, regardless of ownership.412 On the other hand, the
Ninth Circuit has adopted a far narrower interpretation of Hicks.
Specifically, in Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area v. LaRance,
he co concl ded, he e he e a e no fficien compe ing a e
interests at play, . . . the tribe has regulatory jurisdiction through its
inherent authority to exclude, independent from the power
recognized in Montana. 413 The Ninth Circuit recognized that
Indian , e en hen he lack c iminal j i dic ion o e a nonIndian defendan , [ ] po e hei adi ional and ndi p ed po er
to exclude persons whom they deem to be undesirable from tribal
See generally, Montana, 450 U.S. 544.
533 U.S. 353 at 375-376 (2001).
410 Id.
411 Id.
412 Philip H. Tinker, In Search of a Civil Solution: Tribal Authority to Regulate
Nonmember Conduct in Indian Country, 50 TULSA L. REV. 193, 201 02 (2014).
413 Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 810
(9th Cir. 2011 (hereinafter Water Wheel).).
408
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land . 414 The Ninth Circuit went further and stated that the
a ho i o e cl de non-Indian of en inhe en l gi e a ibe
he po e o eg la e, pecificall place condi ion on en ry, on
con in ed p e ence, o on e e a ion cond c . 415
Therefore, given that Indian tribes have regulatory and
adjudicative authority tribes should be able to have jurisdiction
when a forum selection clause or other contractual relationship
exists as a condition to enter.
III.

RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PRACTICES AND THE NEED FOR
TRADITIONAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN INDIAN COUNTRY

The traditional legal system for Indians is typically very
different from Euro-American law.416 For that reason, when
European settlers came to America, they did not recognize Indian
legal systems.417 As discussed above, that trend has continued to this
day. Nonetheless, it is useful to contrast Euro-American crime and
punishment with rehabilitative practices traditionally and currently
used in Indian Country.
Euro-American law splits types of wrongs into two
categories, harm to society and harm to an individual.418 Courts are
divided into two systems to deal with each type of harm either
having a criminal case or a civil case. 419 The difference between
these two systems are demonstrated in several ways. For example,
in a c iminal ca e he p o ec o a e i led a The People, The
S a e, o The Uni ed S a e compa ed o he indi id al name in
a civil case.420 Another example between criminal and civil cases is
the punishment. In criminal cases, criminal defendants are often
imprisoned, while in a civil matter the harm is repaired with a
monetary gain.421 Legal scholars have several policies for
differentiating and employing civil and criminal punishments. 422
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419 Id. at 4.
420 Id. at 3.
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Additionally, criminal law has four theories of punishment
retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.423
Unlike Euro-American justice systems, traditional Indian
legal systems often times did not differentiate between actions that
harmed an individual and actions that harmed a community. 424 In
fact, tribal tradition would often times consider any harm done to an
individual to be a harm to the whole. 425 Another difference is that
Indian legal systems are usually entirely oral, spiritual, and
intertwined with stories that teach both children and adults social
norms.426 Their belief system fuels and informs their legal system.
For instance, tribal law tended to focus on communities rather than
the individual because hei belief
em highligh ed d ie and
e pon ibili ie o familie , clan , and he ibe. 427 In EuroAmerican law, unlike traditional tribal law, the law focuses on
individual rights, like those enumerated in the U.S. Constitution. 428
Of course, not all tribes are the same. There are 562 federally
recognized tribes429 in North America with cultures that expand the
distance of 9.54 million square miles. 430 Many people of Indian
tribes did have individual rights and those rights were often
considered necessary to fulfill responsibilities to the larger
community.431 For instance, the Yurok believed justice for every
wrong could be dealt with through negotiation or compensation. 432
Not only is Euro-American and traditional Indian
philosophy different, but so is their implementation of punishment.
T adi ional Indian c l e foc ed on e o ing peace and ha mon
o he indi id al and comm ni . 433 While there are limitless
Id. at 16.
Id. at 4.
425 Id. at 9.
426 Id. at 10.
427 Id. at 13.
428 Id. at 13.
429 An Introduction to Indian Nations in the United States, NATIONAL CONGRESS
OF AMERICAN INDIANS, available at http://www.ncai.org/about-tribes
[https://perma.cc/G2M5-VURP]. This number only includes federally
recognized tribes and does not include the tribes that have been demolished,
killed, or have not yet or will not be federally recognized. Id. Indian history is
complex in America and should not be limited. Id.
430 U.S. S a e Dep , Common Core Document to U.N. Committee on Human
Rights (Nov. 1997) https://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/og98005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EG5T-FZ4H].
431 Garrow, supra note 43, at 14.
432 Id.
433 Id. at 16.
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amounts of traditional forms of justice, the Navajo tradition of
Peacemaking has the most extensive information due to the years of
implementation and research compared to the recent revitalization
of traditional forms of justice in other tribes.
A. Introduction to the Process and Purpose of Traditional Forms
of Justice
Peacemaking is a traditional form of justice from the Navajo
Tribe.434 This form of justice has gained traction with other Indian
nations throughout the United States. 435 In fact, a small number of
counties throughout the United States have started to use traditional
forms of justice on a trial basis. 436
Peacemaking i con ide ed ho i on al fo m of j ice,
which means that the system is non-hierarchical.437 For instance, the
victim, offender, and all those affected by the crime discuss the
issue, and express their feelings to get to the underlying problems.438
The purpose of this practice is to restore harmony to everyone
included in the proceedings and the community at large. 439 This is
done by both discussing the problem and participating in lessons that
teach the values of the community. 440 In contrast, the model in the
Uni ed S a e i
e ical which relies on hierarchies. For
example, the judge controls the courtroom, the attorneys are
adversarial, and only one-party wins.441
The philosophy of peacemaking has two core principles
hozho and hoxcho.442 Hozho mean ha mon in he en i onmen ,
while its opposite, hoxcho, means an imbalance of ha mon . 443 The
purpose of the peacemaking justice system is to look at the core of

See Wanda D. McCaslin, JUSTICE AS HEALING: INDIGENOUS WAYS (Wanda
McCaslin, 1st ed. 2005).
435 Xiaobing Xu, Different Mediation Traditions: A Comparison Between China
and the U.S., AMERICAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 542 (2005).
436 See, e.g., Janine Geske & India McCanse, Neighborhoods Healed Through
Restorative Justice, 15 NO. 1 DISP. RESOL. MAG 16 (2008).
437 Marilyn Holly, Navajo Criminal Justice: A Jungian Perspective, NATIVE
AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 17 (2006).
438 Id. at 17 18.
439 Id. at 18.
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441 Id. at 17.
442 Id. at 18.
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the disruption and bring it to balance. Therefore, the courts look to
heal, no p ni h. 444
The procedure of the peacemaking court is specific to the
Navajo nation beginning with a prayer and asking for help to the
creator for a successful ceremony. 445 The purpose of the prayer is to
bring an energy to the room that arouses focus and energizes
people in en ion o ha he can iden if he di ha mon .446 Those
who are present are encouraged to express their feelings and state
what they think caused the problem. 447 After the attitudes and
feelings of the participants have been expressed and acknowledged,
an elder or peacemaker gives their guidance in a form of a lecture to
the disputants.448 When each pe on kno each o he feeling ,
and has heard the values and traditions of their people, they are ready
to begin discussing how to resolve the dispute. 449 The resolution
plan should compensate and sufficiently restore good feelings to all
those who are concerned. 450
B. How Similar Methods of Justice has been Implemented in NonIndian Country
Some counties in the United States have begun using
peacemaking for example, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Judges have
begun experimenting with using Native-American inspired justice
systems.451 The retributive system of justice in Milwaukee has
created a revolving door of incarceration that continues from onegeneration to the next. 452 Milwaukee has one of the highest
incarceration rates of African-Americans in the country.453 Like
many large cities, there is daily violent crime and prisons are
filled.454 Milwaukee, recognizing this issue, is attempting methods
of justice other than the Euro-American system.
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Justice Janine P. Geske, a Milwaukee Supreme Court
Justice, has shared her experience and results of implementing this
experimental justice system. 455 According to Justice Geske,
Mil a kee implemen a ion i ba ed on Na ajo Peacemaking. 456
Like in Navajo Peacemaking courts, the victim, the perpetrator, and
the community are all invited. 457 She states that the main difference
between Navajo Peacemaking and traditional forms of EuroAmerican justice systems is the person leading the discussion. In
Mil a kee e o a i e j ice p og am, he Re o a i e J stice
Ini ia i e lead he comm ni engagemen ec ion and ope a e a
restorative justice model for achieving new outcomes.458
Milwaukee implemented restorative justice concepts to
dec ea e c ime b implemen ing al e na i e mean of la
enforcement, increased community engagement, and new
p ac ice . 459 The justice system strives toward these goals by
de eloping ela ion hip ,
eng hening comm ni
ie , and
holding alking ci cle fo a a ie
of con i encie . 460
Ma q e e
e o a i e j ice p ac ice i highligh ed a being
ic im-d i en and eek o place ha m in he middle of he
eq a ion. 461 The highlighting difference between the two justice
philosophies is punishment versus healing.
In Milwaukee, there are two different kinds of peacemaking
courts. The first type of peacemaking court is for offenders returning
from prison. The second is for first-time offenders using restorative
justice as an alternative to a jail sentence. 462 For those returning from
prison there are two steps in the process the first step is the premeeting, and the second step is the talking circle. 463 In the premeeting, law enforcement talks to the offender to let the offender
know that sending them to prison is not the goal of the state;
however, they also alert the offender that they are being observed
for the safety of the community. 464 The offender then goes into the
Peacemaking circle, where the community is there to support the
Id.
Id.
457 Id.
458 Id.
459 Id.
460 Id.
461 Id.
462 Id.
463 Id.
464 Id.
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offender, but also to notify the offender they will not put up with the
violence in their community anymore. 465 The community, victim,
and offender talk for many this is the first time any of them get to
tell their story.466 Support is given to everyone on an individualized
manner depending on how the discussion progresses.467 One of the
keys of Peacemaking is to get the victim to describe their life before
the crime, what they experienced during the offense, and how the
event has affected them. 468 The more the victim shares, the more
powerful the experience and the better chance for a positive
experience for those involved healing for the victim, decreased
chance of recidivism for the offender, and feeling safe for the
community.
With such a different purpose, also came starkly different
results. Justice Geske shared several stories of her experience with
the peacemaking court. These stories were highly emotional and
moved the participants in ways that will change their lives two
stories specifically demonstrate the spectrum of community-wide
benefits. In the first story, there was a member of the Latin Kings
gang, who had just been released from jail. The ex-gang member
shared his story with the community, one of which was an officer
who had a lengthy, but compassionate, story he shared with the exgang member. After the meeting, the ex-gang membe app oached
[ he] compa iona e office af e he ci cle and old him ha he had
never had a discussion with an officer like that before.469 The police
officer and gang member shared their contact information and they
have stayed in contact since. 470 In another similar story, a mother of
a police officer shared her story of losing her son.471 The officer
went into a gas station to buy a cup of coffee, when he exited, he
was stopped by two men at gunpoint wanting to rob him. 472 The two
men patted down the police officer for a wallet, and when the
robbers felt his gun they shot and killed him. 473
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These two stories share how people felt before and after
these criminal acts were committed. Often times, offenders are
i ola ed f om he comm ni and do no feel he ic im o he
comm ni ie o o , pain, and lo . F he mo e, he ic im i able
to talk to the offender, which victims have stated have helped in the
healing p oce . J ice Ge ke belie e ha
e o a i e j ice
circles work because they create a safe place for everyone at the
able, hile emo ing bo nda ie ha keep people epa a ed. 474
C. The Benefits of Having Traditional Forms of Justice in Indian
Country
Restorative justice works in both Indian communities and
non-Indian communities.475 States are allowed to use restorative
justice on people of all races; however, Indians are not able to
practice criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.476 This inability to
practice criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians hurts tribal
sovereignty, victims of crimes, the community, and the offenders.
Using restorative justice to deal with crime could help Indian
communities overcome high crime rates and heal community-wide
trauma by empowering victims and strengthening the communities.
To show the benefits of traditional forms of justice, this section
begins with how traditional forms of justice have failed Indians.
Next, this section discusses how traditional forms of justice may
heal and empower Indian people and communities in ways that
Euro-American justice has failed.
1. Indians Suffer from High Crime Rates in their
Communities
Indians experience violent crimes at a far higher than the
general population.477 In fact, Native Americans are more than two
times as likely to be a victim of a crime than all other races
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476 See supra Section II.
477 National Institute of Justice, Tribal Crime and Justice, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
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combined, or any race individually. 478 Of those crimes committed
against Indians thirty percent of murders of Indians people were
committed by non-Indians.479 In sixty-six percent of assaults against
Indians, the perpetrators were described as white. 480 In total, sixty
percent of Indian victims surveyed described their assailant as
white.481
Indian omen pecificall
ffe
he highe
a e of
dome ic iolence, e al iolence, and e afficking of an o he
group in the United States. 482 Native American woman are three
times more likely to experience domestic violence than any other
racial group.483 And seventy-five percent of all Native American
women experience some form of sexual assault in their lives. 484
H man afficke ha e been kno n o ec i a Na i e Ame ican
schools, group homes, youth centers, and powwows.485 Even though
Indian women are victims at a rate beyond other groups, Native
American men are still more likely to be crime-victims, than their
female counterparts.486
Despite the high crime rate, Native American people are less
likely than other races to report crimes. 487 Some of the reasons that
Na i e Ame ican do no epo c ime em f om a ide a a of
ea on , ch a c l al ba ie and high le el of mi
of hi e

Bureau of Justice Statistics, American Indians and Crime, U.S. DEP T OF
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domina ed agencie . 488 The mistrust comes from calculable
shortcomings within Indian Country. For instance, women who
epo dome ic ab e con in all epo ha police did no p o ide
adequate protection or follow-up services in response to the
omen call . 489 Another issue is that without an investigation,
police often do not believe the women who report crimes. For
instance, when one woman called to report domestic violence, the
police required her to undress to show them the bruises.490 The
police then reported she was drunk, even contrary to hospital reports
saying she was not under the influence of any intoxicants.491
Abuse toward Native Americans perpetuates the issues
within the Indian community, which leads to generations of abused
people.492 These high crime rates create a wound in the community,
one that would traditionally be mended through community action
and restorative justice.493 If shut off from traditional forms of justice,
which aim to restore the community, the community continues to
suffer. Thus, federal laws that have created barriers to traditional
forms of justice that would be better suited at healing Indian
communities, inflict lasting pain on the community. For instance,
the Oliphant decision has limited the ability of Indian court systems
of holding non-Indian people in their judicial system. Since
approximately sixty percent of crimes against Indians are committed
by what Indian people identify as white, the Oliphant decision limits
Indian judicial review in nearly two-thirds of crimes against Indians.
Further, The Major Crimes Act disturbs traditional justice
methods by removing criminal jurisdiction from Indian Courts into
Federal Courts. Indian courts may maintain concurrent jurisdiction
with federal courts; however, the federal government tends to hold
defendants and criminals and not turn them over for an extended
amount of time. This can keep the tribe from dealing with the
suffering or loss from the victim and disorient the community for
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months and sometimes even years depending on how long it takes
for the federal government to investigate and try a case.
2. Healing Trauma in Court
a. Re-Enforcing Power to the Victims
Allowing traditional forms of justice may lessen the affects
that being a victim will have in the future. For instance,
psychological studies have shown that thirty-five percent of male
sexual abusers have had been sexually molested as a child. 494 In fact,
those who have been abused, especially sexually, are far more likely
to commit crime in general. 495 Beyond the cycle of criminality, those
who have been abused are also more likely to suffer from
alcoholism, sexual maladjustment, and multiple personality
disorder.496 Although these statistics are troubling, Martha Erickson,
a psychologist at the University of Minnesota, states, to fix the issue,
he comm ni
need[ ] o co n e ac he child e pec a ion ha
ad l
ill be deepl nca ing. 497 Traditional forms of restorative
j ice in ol e he comm ni , and can help co n e ac offende
antisocial behavior by recognizing that the offender may have been
victimized previously.
Traditional forms of Indian justice are victim oriented, and
result in a more caring culture, created with the purpose of
healing.498 Peacemaking look a a a ie of ailmen ha
a ma
can cause including the spiritual, emotional, physical, and mental
ailments that come with being a victim. 499 This healing is
M. Glasses, et al., Cycle of Child Sexual Abuse: Links Between Being a
Victim and Becoming a Perpetrator, 179 J. OF PSYCHIATRY 482, 482 (2001).
495 Australian Institute of Family Studies, The long-term effects of child sexual
abuse, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (2013),
https://aifs.gov.au/cfca/publications/long-term-effects-child-sexualabuse/interpersonal-outcomes [https://perma.cc/H9UN-NABM] (the study found
that there were no differences between Australian aboriginal victims and nonaboriginal victims).
496 Daniel Coleman, Sad Legacy of Abuse: The Search for Remedies, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 24, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/24/science/sad-legacy-ofabuse-the-search-for-remedies.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/YHG8EBVS].
497 Id.
498 Gloria Lee, Defining Traditional Healing, JUSTICE AS HEALING: INDIGENOUS
WAYS, 98 (2005).
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individualized and does not focus on attempting to cure the
symptoms, but the root of their affliction. 500 Furthermore, because
those most affected by the victimization are involved by the
sentencing process and have input in the decision have shown to be
able to handle mental health issues better. 501
b. Strengthening the Community
Another benefit of restorative justice is to heal the
community. With Indian communities having some of the highest
crime rates in the United States, many Indian people do not feel safe
in their own neighborhoods. 502 Violence in the community affects
more than just the victim, it also affects the community as those
members no longer feel safe in their own home. Community
members are explicitly listed as a part of the participants in nearly
all Indian traditional justice. 503 Similar to a victim, participating in
the circle allows the community to give transparency to the
problems of the community and be a participant, not a spectator. Not
only is there more transparency, but traditional means of justice
allows the community to hea he offende
o and pa icipa e in
the healing.504 As Chief Justice Yazzie of the Navajo tribe states:
What is an offender? It is someone who shows little
regard for right relationships. That person has little
respect for others. Navajos say of ch a pe on, He
ac a if he ha no ela i e . So, ha do o do
when someone acts as if they have no relatives? You
bring in the relatives!505
This idea goes to the ideology that the community is there to help.
Navajo Peacemaking court not only gives the victim a community
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to rely on, but gives the community involvement to learn the
offender and realize they are humans who hurt just like them. 506
IV.

USING THE MONTANA RULE AND CIVIL JURISDICTION TO
ENFORCE TRIBAL JUSTICE

Given current law, tribes should be able to create consensual
relationships when a person enters Indian Country to allow
traditional forms of justice between Indians and non-Indians. This
paper has delved into whether a tribe can create a consensual
contractual relationship with those entering. It appears, that a tribe
can. The following section focuses on the specifics of what tribes
have attempted to do and where tribes have failed. Specifically,
where tribes have generally failed in the past, is that tribes have
attempted to extend jurisdiction through the internet, which neither
em f om he ibe inhe en o e eign a ho i o e condi ion
on entry, preserve tribal self-government, or control internal
ela ion no did i em f om an ac ion ha ela ed o aid
inherent sovereignty. However, traditional forms of justice, for
healing and c iminal ac i i
em f om all of i . A pe on
criminal conduct and entry onto tribal land relates to the inherent
sovereignty of the tribe.
A. Contractual Agreements Creating Civil Jurisdiction for
Traditional Forms of Justice
General rules of contracts would allow a contract to be
formed by a sign when entering reservation land. 507 For a contract
to be formed, both an offer and acceptance is required. 508 The
reservation in making its offer may require acceptance in
pe fo ming a pecified ac . 509 The non-Indian en
o ld
constitute acceptance. Furthermore, if an offeree does not read the
ign, i doe no make he offe o accep ance in alid a no
Id. at 194.
Although general rules of contracts are being discussed here, generally, there
is no federal common law for contracts and deference to the tribal contract law
would apply when a forum selection clause gives jurisdiction to the tribe.
Jackson v. Payday Loans, 764 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2014).
508 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 22 (1981).
509 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 30 (1981).
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no ifica ion i nece a o make ch an accep ance. 510 Here, a
non-Indian accep ance of he con ac choosing to come onto
tribal property with notice that doing so will subject them to tribal
justice in civil disputes demonstrates the non-Indian accep ance.
511

A contract also requires consideration. 512 Consideration is
[ ]ome hing ( ch a an ac , a fo bea ance, o a e n p omi e)
bargained for and received by a promisor from a p omi e. 513 In this
case, there would be adequate consideration. It is a well-established
rule that tribes have the power, as a sovereign, to exclude nonIndians or even non-member Indians.514 In exchange, the Indian
nation maintains the ability to have civil jurisdiction over the nonIndian people. Because tribes have the power, as a sovereign, to
exclude people from their reserved land there is a detriment for a
bargain being exchanged. Using performance contract principles,
tribes could require visitors to consent to tribal justice upon entering
tribal land.
Assuming a valid contract is formed, the consensual
relationship the contract m
ill ha e a ne
o he
regulation being imposed here tribal justice. 515 As discussed in
the Dolgencorp case, there is a nexus between the consensual
ela ion hip and eg la ion hen he eg la ion p po e i
p o ec ing [ he ibe ] o n child en on i o n land. 516 By this
ea oning, a ne
e i
hen he ibe
eg la ion e e o
protect its own people on its own land, even when applied to nonIndians. The nexus in this proposal is no different: this consensual
relationship provides a way for Indian communities to heal from the
trauma inflicted by non-Indian on Indian violence. By requiring
consent to tribal justice in exchange for entry, the tribe ensures tribal
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 54 (1981).
A o ne P oce & In e iga ion Se ices, Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe, 609
F.3d 927, 938 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining that courts look to the non-Indian
conduct in determining whether there is a consensual relationship).
512 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 (1981).
513 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 81 (1981).
514 Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802
(hereinafter Water Wheel) (citing United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200
(2004)).
510
511

Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d at 172.
Payday Fin., LLC 764 F.3d at 782 (citing the Federal Arbitration Act;
Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 174
(5th Cir. 2014).
515
516

101

access to traditional justice. Although a contract may be formed,
whether the contract is enforceable, specifically a forum selection
clause, can be a trickier issue.
B. Application of Forum Selection Clause
Generally, forum selection clauses are enforceable. 517
Specifically, Indian tribes have generally been able to enforce forum
selection clauses. 518 However, the courts have limited the reach of
forum selection clauses for tribal jurisdiction in certain
circumstances.519 Namely, federal courts have limited forum
selection clauses made in Indian Country to the extent that a tribal
co ha adj dica i e j i dic ion. 520 Federal courts have stated
that subject matter jurisdiction in tribal courts over non-Indians, is
e he ed o he nonmembe ac ion . . . on he ibal land. 521 In
sum, for a forum selection clause to be enforceable the court will
look to the actions of the party, the non-Indian, to find whether a
tribe has adjudicative jurisdiction. In Western Sky Financial, the
court stated that declaring, over the internet, that you were
physically present on tribal land was a legal fiction.522 That the
defendant in that case never showed up to the reservation nor did the
defendant pay money on the reservation. 523 The case implies, then,
that actual presence is sufficient to create adjudicative
jurisdiction.524
Courts have upheld arbitration clauses on non-Indian fee
land.525 However, that decision did not discuss the issue of fee land

Ninigret Development Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Housing
Authority, 32 F.Supp. 2d 497, 504 (1999) (overturned on other grounds).
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521 Payday Fin., LLC, 764 F.3d at 782.
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and non-fee land.526 Instead, whether a forum selection clause is
valid in application of Indian land depends on several factors.
When deciding whether a forum selection clause is valid,
courts apply an Erie choice of law inquiry.527 In contracts, the court
applies the law of the jurisdiction whose rules will govern the rest
of the dispute.528 In Payday Financial, the court was prepared to
apply tribal law to the forum selection clause, however, in a
pplemen al b ief, he ibe a unable to locate tribal precedent
add e ing fo m elec ion cla e . 529 Instead, the court applied
fede al la and looked a he he he la
a
n ea onable nde
he ci c m ance . 530 The court noted that only three circumstances
where the presumptive validity of an arbitration clause is suspect:
(1) if their incorporation into the contract was the
result of fraud, undue influence or overweening
bargaining power; (2) if the selected forum is so
g a el diffic l and incon enien ha [ he
complaining party] will for all practical purposes be
dep i ed of i da in co [ ] ; o (3) if enfo cemen
of the clauses would contravene a strong public
policy of the forum in which the suit is brought,
declared by statute or judicial decision. 531
In this particular circumstance, the court stated that because the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe did not authorize arbitration, hire
arbitrators, and does not have consumer dispute rules the forum
selection was invalid. 532
Analyzing the shortcomings of the Cheyenne River Sioux
T ibe a bi a ion p oce ma help o he ibe o nde and he
procedural maze that is involved with federal, state, and tribal
jurisdictions that all compete for jurisdiction in these manners, and
to have more success. First, tribes should have tribal statutes
outlining forum selection clauses, defining terms, and looking at
case statute. Second, forum selection clauses should not be
n ea onable nde he ci c m ance . Fo in ance, he cla e
See id.
Payday Fin., LLC, 764 F.3d at 776.
528 Id. at 775.
529 Id. at 775 76.
530 Id. at 776.
531 Id.
532 Id.
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should not be illusory or unconscionable both of which is a
generally good practice to ensure that parties participating in
alternative dispute resolution come out satisfied. 533
While forum selection clauses are unlikely to cover all who
enter Indian Country, especially non-fee land, any expansion of
jurisdiction over non-Indian and non-member Indians having
accountability to the tribe and its people is a step towards healing.
V.

CONCLUSION

Traditional forms of Indian justice are beneficial for Indian
victims and the community, as well as non-Indian offenders.534 Due
to the Supreme Court case Oliphant, Indians do not have access to
traditional forms of criminal justice. 535 While this paper proposes
contracts to create a consensual relationship to extend civil
jurisdiction to non-Indians, the larger idea is that Indian people need
to use creativity in the legal system to access forms of justice better
suited to healing Indian communities. Civil jurisdiction may be one
means to erode barriers to Indian justice, but Indian communities
have struggled since Euro-American law was imposed on them.
Indian people need an expansion of tribal sovereignty, not a
restriction, that has been the pattern as of colonization, to help Indian
people. Extending tribal court jurisdiction to non-Indians and
reinstating traditional justice would be a powerful step toward reempowering tribal sovereignty and Indian people.

See supra Section IV.
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